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A CONFESSION OF MURDER: THE
PSYCHIATRIST'S DILEMMA
Philip J. Candilis,M.D. and Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The case of the panic-stricken felon who admits to his psychiatrist
that another man has been sentenced to death for his crime epitomizes a classic ethical tension in psychiatry. On one hand stand the
principles-among them autonomy and fidelity-that promote the
confidentiality of patients' communications; on the other are the
competing principles-including beneficence and justice-that advance
other ends. How are such tensions resolved?
We take the view that ethical principles are not absolute, but
binding on a prima facie basis. Principles in general are applicable
unless opposed by principles of equal or stronger justification. To
resolve the ethical dilemma, we need to identify and weigh the ethical
principles involved in the context of psychiatric care. We also need
to consider an alternative approach to ethical reasoning-utilitarianism-and what effect it might have on the resolution of the conflict.
II. THE DUTY TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY
The roots of confidentiality in psychiatry, as in medicine, run
deep. The Hippocratic Oath' itself required that what was seen or
heard in the life of men should not be "spread abroad," although
some commentators claim that this statement may have been more a
strategy for gaining economic advantage over competitors than any
profound endorsement of patient confidentiality. The 1948 Declaration of Geneva of the World Medical Association held that all
information divulged by patients ought to be kept confidential. The
British and American Medical Associations subsequently qualified this
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standard of absolute confidentiality by recognizing countervailing legal
requirements and the potential need to protect individual patients or
society. The American Psychiatric Association also recognizes a
qualified standard of confidentiality but urges erring in favor of
confidentiality in cases of uncertainty. Clearly, the traditions
developed in professional codes both underscore the importance of
confidentiality and suggest its potential limits.
When professional organizations set higher standards than may
otherwise be expected of common social intercourse, such codes and
traditions demarcate important ethical boundaries. Professional
codes, however, are often driven by specific interests of the profession
and are variable enough to require a more comprehensive statement
of guiding principles. Furthermore, tradition is not a moral warrant-explicit justification is required for any moral act. Robert
Veatch, in developing his triple-contract theory of medical ethics-citizen-citizen, professional-society, and professionallayperson-appropriately cites obligations to the lay public and to
external review in limiting the moral weight given to professional
codes.2 Consequently, although professional codes may provide a
starting point for general discussions of confidentiality, we need to
explore the particular principles that underlie the value of confidentiality in psychiatry.
Confidentiality is rooted in two primary principles: autonomy and
fidelity. Patient autonomy is served by the confidentiality of psychotherapeutic relationships. Patients have the freedom to explore
intimate secrets, thoughts, wishes, and fantasies in a manner that
permits healing, self-knowledge, and attainment of personal goals.
These outcomes collectively enhance the patient's "self-rule."
Consequently, autonomy is not only a bulwark of principlism 3 in
medical ethics, but also an important goal of psychiatric treatment.
Fidelity, or promise keeping, is likewise a cardinal principle of
ethics, as well as an important support for confidentiality.4 A person
entering a psychiatrist's office reasonably expects that information
divulged will be held in confidence, whether this is promised explicitly
or merely implied. This reasonable expectation gives rise to a

2. ROBERT M. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 108-38 (1981).
3. Principlism describes an approach to ethical reasoning that first specifies and then,
analyzes principles of ethical behavior.
4. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL

ETHICS 341-42 (3d ed. 1989).
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legitimate moral claim against a profession and a therapeutic process
that ground themselves in the trustworthiness of this transaction.
With such strong, principled support for confidentiality, every
reasonable effort should be made to find alternatives to breaching
confidentiality for the sake of opposing interests. Thus, in the case in
question, we take it for granted that the psychiatrist will explore the
patient's willingness to turn himself in, or to give the psychiatrist
permission to do so. But as Ben Jones has already told his attorney,
his mother didn't raise no fool. He is not yet ready to confess to the
murder for which Frank Smith has been convicted unless his attorney
finds a way to make a deal. We assume for the purposes of this
discussion that the easy way out of this dilemma is closed to the
psychiatrist. Confidentiality cannot be protected without sacrificing
other values. What, then, are the competing duties and their
underlying principles with which the psychiatrist must contend?
III. THE DUTY TO RESCUE
The duty to rescue third parties is grounded in the principle of
beneficence. A strong version of beneficence might require a person
to actively promote the good of others. Fortunately, for our purposes
here, we need only consider the weaker, more philosophically modest
version of the principle which asks that people act only, to prevent
harm to third parties. The harm in question is the death of Frank
Smith, innocent of the murder for which he has been convicted.
Although the application of the duty to rescue is quite controversial-as we shall see shortly- even an American polity that has
been reluctant in general to impose affirmative duties for the benefit
of third parties has recognized that such duties may exist in the
medical setting. Moreover, these duties may trump the duty to guard
patient confidentiality. Thus, the law requires physicians and other
healthcare providers to report gunshot wounds, certain communicable
diseases, and suspected abuse of children, elders, and disabled
persons. In addition, psychiatrists and other psychotherapists have
been held to have duties to protect third parties from their patients'
violence. In each of these cases, the benefit to the general good has
been determined to outweigh the harm to patients' interests in
confidentiality. Why should this rationale not extend to our case?
Perhaps the reason for stopping short of that conclusion here lies
in the justifications for resisting broader duties to rescue in American
ethics and law. Objections to wide-ranging duties to rescue are often
couched in terms of undue burdens on liberty. If persons are obliged
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to be beneficent, it is argued, the weight of incremental obligations
may overwhelm the liberty to pursue individual goals. Alternatively,
some maintain that the uncompensated labor of rescue limits
economic freedom and thus militates against endorsing the duty.
How potent are such objections in our case? It is difficult to argue
that a requirement to save a life would materially burden psychiatrists
when the knowledge is available to do so. Such instances are highly
unlikely to occur, and the means of discharging the duty are relatively
apparent. True, the police may question the psychiatrist, and her
testimony may be required at trial. But these obligations are not
beyond those ordinarily imposed on citizens who, by chance, become
witnesses to a crime. The burdens in this case are de minimis.
Other objections to imposing duties to rescue arise from the
belief that such obligations cannot be easily bounded. The duty to
rescue, it is argued, is inherently limitless. This approach often relies
on "slippery slope" or "wedge" arguments, rather than on justifications that discriminate among cases. The slippery slope approach has
received criticism for not drawing a particular moral distinction
because of the potential need to make difficult distinctions further
down the slope. A moment's reflection is enough to recognize how
the argument would work here. If we justify a duty to rescue Frank
Smith who is about to be put to death, would we hold the same for
Patty Johnson who is unjustly serving ten years in prison? What of
Jim Franklin who is but two weeks shy of completing a six-month
sentence? Or Betty Adams, who is about to pay a twenty-five dollar
fine for her neighbor's offense of shoveling snow into a public street.
These are all real questions that, if we accept the moral legitimacy of a duty to rescue, we shall have to address as they arise. They
are not, however, reasons to avoid invoking a duty in this case, where
the harm is the loss of an innocent life. Slippery slope arguments are
philosophically unsound because they move the bounds of argumentation, thus ceding the moral ground. Either saving Frank Smith's life
justifies breaching confidentiality or it does not. The conclusion
either way is logically independent of the result that might be reached
in any of the cases further down the slope.
There are, moreover, aspects of the situation in question that
provide natural boundaries for a duty to rescue and prevent us from
embracing a wider version of the duty-although we do not mean to
suggest that more generally applicable duties to rescue could not be
defended. The psychiatrist is one of a small number of people-all
of whom face similar ethical conflicts-in possession of the knowledge
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that could save Frank Smith's life. Were the information even more
widely known, it might be argued that the primary duty to rescue
should be assigned to someone without a countervailing duty of
confidentiality. Furthermore, as suggested above, the rescue can be
accomplished with relatively little effort. These are precisely the
conditions identified by Levmore under which our society has been
most willing to endorse a duty to rescue: The holder of the duty can
be clearly identified and the burden is minimal.'
The duty to rescue seems to provide a potent counterweight to
the duty to maintain confidentiality. But before we decide whether
Dr. Palmer should call the police, we need to consider an additional
duty that might make our decision easier.
IV. THE DUTY TO PROMOTE JUSTICE

What claim might an ethical duty to promote a just outcome have
on Ben Jones's psychiatrist? John Rawls's theory of justice provides
the foundation for an analysis of this question.6 From Rawls's
perspective of justice as fairness, the duty to support and comply with
just institutions is a fundamental natural duty.7 As a natural duty, it
exists between individuals irrespective of their institutional relationships;' thus, if the basic societal structure is as just as can be reasonably expected, all actors have a natural duty to help promote it.
Although Rawls derives his theory from a contractarian perspective,
he does not presuppose an act of express or tacit consent-here by
Ben Jones. In the case where a psychiatrist faces a gross miscarriage
of justice and a duty of confidentiality, the duty to promote justice-as the more fundamental of the two-prevails.
Indeed, one might argue that the obligation to promote justice
applies with particular force to a physician or similar professional.
The attainment of professional and social standing is not entirely a
just or rational process. Individuals can gain standing by winning a
series of biological and social lotteries. They may be born into
favorable circumstances, resist disease and early death, and
serendipitously avoid economic want, social deprivation, or plain bad
luck. They may come upon good opportunities by chance or inher-

5. Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue. An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive
Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations,72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986).
6. JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
7. Id. at 115.
8. Id at 334.
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ently possess a talent valued by others. Such individuals, some
commentators claim, owe a greater duty to society by virtue of the
stature gained from social definitions of worth and other natural
lotteries. Consequently, psychiatrists may legitimately be asked to pay
a higher price-the burden of acting to promote a just outcome-for
their status in the community.
Arguing strictly from the perspective of principlism, then, there
appear to be two strong principles that suggest sacrifice of confidentiality may be the ethically desirable outcome. Such a conclusion
would be even stronger if it comported with an estimate of the
practical harms and benefits of Dr. Palmer's action. We turn next to
a consideration of these utilitarian concerns.
V.

THE UTILITARIAN PERSPECTIVE

In contrast to principlism, utilitarianism focuses on the gains and
losses from a particular course of behavior, either in a specific case or
as a general rule. Indeed, the policy debate surrounding confidentiality in psychiatric treatment is most often framed as a utilitarian issue:
whether the harms that flow from failing to protect patient confidentiality outweigh whatever benefits may be gained. So as not to consider the consequences of broadscale intrusions on the confidentiality

of psychiatric treatment-such as opening the psychiatrist's consulting
room to the medical equivalent of courtroom television-it should be
emphasized that our concern here is with the specific issue raised by
the Frank Smith/Ben Jones case: whether a psychiatrist should reveal
confidential information that will save a person's life.
The key objection to. any limitation on psychotherapeutic
confidentiality is that it will deter patients in general from seeking

treatment or from revealing sufficient information to benefit from
treatment because they fear the betrayal of their confidences.
Although utilitarian arguments are ultimately empirical, research data
offers little assistance in determining the existence or magnitude of
this effect. To be sure, surveys of patients, potential patients, and
psychotherapists have shown repeatedly that confidentiality is highly
valued. Many patients report they would not have sought treatment
without some assurance that their communications would be protected. Nonpatients claim that they would not even consider psychotherapy without such guarantees.
It is difficult to evaluate the scope of this effect in the absence of
actual comparisons of patients' behavior under conditions of complete
and less-than-complete confidentiality. Although patients may claim
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that they would avoid treatment without absolute assurances of
privacy, it is likely that they will ultimately weigh the probability and
adverse effects of unwanted disclosure against the probability and
beneficial effects of seeking treatment. Whether any particular
infringement of confidentiality deters people from seeking treatment,
therefore, relates strongly to the nature of the limitation on confidentiality itself
Assume for purposes of analyzing this case that the Smith/Jones
affair ends with Dr. Palmer calling the district attorney's office.
Moreover, given the media appeal of the situation, it makes banner
headlines. Mr. Smith and Dr. Palmer do the daytime talk show
circuit, and a chat-room on America Online is devoted exclusively to
discussions of the case. Thus, it becomes widely known that Dr.
Palmer "turned in" her patient Ben Jones, breaching the confidentiality of their psychotherapeutic relationship. What are the potential
consequences?
It seems very unlikely that large numbers of patients will be
deterred from therapy for fear that they too will be turned over to the
authorities. If Dr. Palmer does a good job explaining that she and her
colleagues would only undertake such an act when another person's
life was at stake, the pool of people at risk of being diverted from
therapy would be limited to undiscovered murderers, a group not
likely to utilize psychotherapy. If Dr. Palmer frames the principle
more broadly and indicates that she would be unwilling to see an
innocent person spend substantial time in prison, the number of
people directly affected grows somewhat, and the slippery slope rears
its ugly head again. But it is difficult to imagine that the average
psychotherapy patient-concerned about a relationship, dysfunctional
behavior at work, or problems with the children-will so identify with
Ben Jones's predicament as to be deterred.
Of course, some people may generalize-incorrectly-from the
Smith/Jones case that psychotherapists cannot be trusted to keep any
confidences at all. Another group will be concerned that their fantasies of violence, much more common than might be imagined, will be
reported to the police. The size of these groups is difficult to
estimate, however, and in both cases their behavior depends on misinterpreting the implications of Dr. Palmer's actions. Such misinterpretation is difficult to guard against under any circumstances.
We might also consider the other side of the coin: A psychiatrist
who acts to save an innocent life and prevent a perversion of justice
may do more to increase respect for the profession than to derogate
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it. Recognizing the difficult dilemma faced by a psychiatrist who is
committed to confidentiality in general, the public may admire her
rectitude in deciding that Frank Smith's life nonetheless comes first.
The overall effect of the episode could be to promote greater use of
psychiatrists' services by the very people who were previously
uncertain about psychiatrists' values.
Whatever the harms that might ensue should Dr. Palmer recount
Ben Jones's confession to the authorities, they do not seem to be of
great magnitude. Although it would be easy-and incorrect-to
assert that the corresponding benefit of saving a life should be given
infinite value, such an exaggeration is unnecessary here. The unquestionably substantial value of preserving Frank Smith's life from an
unjust end by the state seems unopposed by significant negative
consequences. The utilitarian balance appears to tip in favor of
disclosure by Dr. Palmer.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Neither of us in real life looks forward to facing the dilemma
posed by a patient's confession to a capital offense for which someone
else is to be put to death. But we are comfortable that the ethical
analysis outlined here would provide guidance in dealing with the
possibility. Both principlist and utilitarian analyses support the
validity of breaching Ben Jones's confidentiality to save Frank Smith's
life.

